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BOOK REVIEW
FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS-ANTITRUST LAWS. By
AUSTIN T STICKELLS. Rochester, N. Y.. The Lawyers Co-Opera-
tive Publishing Co., 1972. Pp. 930. $35
ELMER J. SCHAEFER*
Professor Stickells has treated the federal antitrust laws in an attrac-
tively printed and compact volume which discusses many interesting
lower court opinions as well as landmark Supreme Court decisions. Un-
fortunately, a student or lawyer attempting to use the book will discover
that it is a compendium of cases rather than an explanation of antitrust
law Moreover, cases are either set forth in excessive detail or presented
obliquely so as to obscure both the issues decided and the reasoning of
the courts. Discussions of cases are juxtaposed with no attempt to ex-
plain the manner in which they fit together, and little attention is given
to the principles of policy which guide or should guide the courts.
Above all, the author reveals a reluctance to draw generalizations or to,
state rules of law The treatment brings to mind John Updike's com-
ment that, while reading a book by an authority on comparative litera-
ture, he could hear "the rustle of the file cards."
The major premise of these criticisms-that it is the task of the text-
book writer to provide simple and clear generalizations about the law-
is founded upon the ostensible value of a textbook to a student or to a
lawyer. In turning to a textbook, a student is probably seeking help in
selecting the important facts or identifying the holdings in a series of
seemingly inconsistent casebook opinions, the reasoning of which appears
obscure and of no assistance in answering hus teacher's questions. In an
ideal textbook, the student expects to find generalizations about what the
law is-black letter law, so to speak-together with answers to some of
the questions that his teacher is raising as to why the law is that way
To be of assistance, therefore, the textbook should provide concise treat-
ment of the relevant cases, together with an indication of factual varia-
tions which may have influenced the outcomes.
OBA., Northwestern Umuversity; M.A., J.D., Harvard Umversity Assistant Pro-i
fessor of Law, The College of William and Mary
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The author of the model textbook imposes clarity and simplicity on the
variously reasoned and often contradictory opinions of a number of
courts through skillful application of standard techniques of legal reason-
ing. Ambiguous judicial language is interpreted by consideration of the
entire opinion and reference to the facts. Contradictory holdings are
reconciled by careful distinctions or explained by consideration of an
emerging trend in the cases, by classification into "majority" and "mi-
nority" rules, by construction of organizing principles not yet expressed
in the cases, and by generous application of the assumption that the
sounder rule will eventually prevail. In short, the author of a good text-
book applies the type of legal analysis which the student is learning to
undertake for himself.
In a sense, the simplicity and clarity which result are artificial: the am-
biguities and uncertainties in the cases remain, although many are absent
from the textbook treatment. However, any legal analysis which seeks
to predict what courts will do requires the exercise of judgment and, in-
evitably, the expression of a personal opinion. Although the task of
explaining a complex body of law in a limited number of pages may
sometimes force the textbook author to express his opinions in a dog-
matic form, writers with strongly held opinions often end up lively and
interesting.
A practicing lawyer, as well as a student, may seek assistance in
cutting through the complexities of relevant precedents and develop-
ing an intelligible generalization by consulting a relevant textbook.
Even though the lawyer may not fully agree with the textbook,
his analysis will often be focused by the author's formulation of the
issues. The simplicity and coherence of textbook principles are inher-
ently persuasive, and a good textbook will influence considerably the
development of its area of the law
Antitrust cases, with their masses of facts and multiple economic
theories, would seem to demand the analytical rigor of the model text-
book described above.' Federal Control of Business falls far short in this
respect.
1. This description of the textbook writer's role resembles the views of the role of
the legal scholar expressed by Learned Hand and Karl Llewellyn. Hand argued that
law professors should assume a special role in working for consistency and fairness
of legal doctrine, partly because they have time to devote to such an endeavor. Hand,
Have the Bencb and Bar Anything to Contribute to the Teaching of Law? 24 MicH.
L. REv. 466, 471 (1926) Llewellyn stated his view of the role of a legal scholar, whether
teacher, practitioner, or judge, in characteristically picturesque terms: "Both in the
structuring of whole fields and in the sweating of clarity out of tangled lumps of five
[Vol. 15.203
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The effect of Stickells' failure to generalize effectively can be illus-
trated by considering the chapter on mergers. Most legal discussions
classify mergers as horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate. Within these
subheadings, it is convenient to assemble cases in which the same theories
of anticompetitive effect have been alleged. For example, conglomerate
merger cases can be classified according to whether potential competi-
tion, entrenchment, or reciprocity theories are alleged. 2 The author,
however, has chosen not to organize his chapter on mergers around legal
theories; as a result, he must repeatedly fall back on the language of the
statute, on quotations construing the statutory language, or on a listing
of facts which he feels a court might consider relevant.
Beginning with a history of section 7 of the Clayton Act,3 the merger
chapter proceeds to a brief defimtion of four merger types: horizontal,
vertical, conglomerate, and "other." 4 Thereafter follows a section on
or fifteen or fifty or a hundred and fifty cases, it is the scholar who must carry the
load first of stump-pulling and then of dreaming or sweating up intelligible tentative
drafts of sound design.' K. LLZwELLaLr, DECiDiNG AppEA.s: Ti CoMmON LAW
TRADmION, 346-47 (1960).
Llewellyn noted, however, that a case rarely arises which can be resolved simply
by following the scholar's prescription: "For the normal case, the scholar's work
provides information , suggestions as to some useful arrangement of material and
as to some more useful posing of an issue, and further scattered suggestions as to wise
solutions.' Id. at 347
The role to be played by the legal textbook may be compared to that ascribed to
scientific textbooks by Thomas Kuhn, the historian of science. Kuhn regards scientific
textbooks as expounding currently accepted scientific beliefs, embodied in what he
calls "paradigms." "Normal science" consists of working out the application of these
paradigms to a variety of situations which have not yet been analyzed. T. KUHN,
THE STucruRi oF SctNnric REVOLuTIONS 10-12 passr= (2d ed. 1970). At one point;
Kuhn compares a paradigm to "an accepted judicial decision in the common law,
[which] is an object for further articulation and specification under new or more
stringent conditions." Id. at 23.
The author of an antitrust textbook will encounter fewer accepted views and ac-
cordingly have more need for creativity than an author of a scientific textbook as
portrayed by Kuhn. What appears to be greater consensus among Kuhn's scientists
than among judges and lawyers may be due to the ability of scientists to generate
their own experiments, whereas courts and lawyers must wait for cases to arise. The
difference may also be a matter of emphasis. Kuhn focuses on the beliefs scientists
share rather than the still-unsettled questions. He sees the glass as half-full rather than
half-empty
2. The merger guidelines of the Department of Justice, outlining the circumstances
m which the Antitrust Division will ordinarily challenge mergers, proceed along these
lines. Stickells sets forth these guidelines m Appendix A of the book but does not
discuss them in the text.
S. A. Sricx.Lts, FEDERAL CoNToL OF BusNss 305-19 (1972).
4. Id. at 320-23.
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concentration, including a discussion of Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States,5 a section on reciprocity, and a section on "ease of entry" 6 At
this point the language of the statute is quoted, and the reader is told that
a "study of the companies involved, the industry, the resulting differences
in competition, the probable differences, the markets affected, access to
the markets, share of the market foreclosed are indicative of the factors
that must be considered in determining the probable competitive conse-
quences of an acquisition "7 7
After discussing the definitions of several important phrases, Stickells
returns to the general legal test, endorsing what he calls a "broad factual
analysis" 8 and rejecting the conclusion of the 1968 supplement report to
the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws that there has developed "a substantial body of post-1955 decisions
which provides some guidelines for defining product and geographic
markets [and affords] significant indicia of probable illegality for hori-
zontal, vertical, and to a lesser degree-conglomerate mergers ")
There follows a section entitled "Functional Approach," in which
Brown Shoe is again summarized at great length, the author concluding-
The total effect of [Brown Shoe] is to adopt a flexible or case by
case approach, a 'functional' view of the merger in the 'context of
its particular industry' Economics and historical factors, includ-
ing the trend to concentration in the industry; statistics, including
statistical and economic analysis of the market shares, are all fac-
tors for consideration.10
This is as much assistance as the author can give.
Stickells' reluctance to attempt a formulation of general principles of
antitrust law may be due to a belief that judicial decisions, at least in the
area of antitrust, should be guided solely by the facts, and that the ap-
plication of a rule formulated in a previous case may distort the court's
judgment by causing it to ignore significant facts which distinguish that
prior decision. Throughout the text he praises a "fluid," "flexible,"
case-by-case approach, in passages such as: "The basis for determimng
the line of commerce or the relevant product market is fluid, requiring a
5. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
6. A. STICELLS, supra note 3, at 323-35.
7. Id. at 335.
8. Id. at 360.
9. AMERIcAN BAR AssocrATioN, AiNTRuST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, at 65 (1968).
10. A. STICKELLS, supra note 3, at 369.
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-case-by-case approach. No one factor is determinative. It is not a
matter solely for mechanical or statistical calculation. Flexibility in ap-
"proach is necessary" 11 The argument, as stated, does not justify dis-
,carding rules: a court can refuse to apply a rule to a distmgushable
,case or, if necessary, modify the rule.' The result of a hesitancy to apply
rules is demonstrated in Federal Control of Business. Without some effort
-to formulate general principles, it is very difficult to compare one case
-witn another; to make comparisons among a number of cases without at-
-tempting to generalize is impossible.13
In emphasizing facts rather than analysis, Stickells makes sparing use
of economic theory, even where the courts have explicitly relied on
*such theory in shaping their decisions. For example, in United States v.
E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.,'4 the Supreme Court employed the
.concept of "cross-elasticity of demand" to test whether DuPont's posi-
tion in the cellophane market amounted to a monopoly Aside from
-quoting the language of the opinion, the textbook does not explain the
,concept or discuss its applicability to other cases.i 5
11. Id. at 343-44.
12. The author's position seems to resemble one of the variants of "rule-skepticism:'
A concise statement of "rule-skepticism" is presented and the concept then cnticized
in H. HART, Tim CoNcPrT OF LAW, 135-36 (1961). Cf. K. LLEWELYN, DEMING
APPFaLs: TmE COMMON LAW TRADITION 179 (1960) ("Rules are not to control,
but to guide decision."); B. CARxozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDICiAL PROcEss 23 (1921)
("The rules and principles of case law have never been treated as final truths,
but as working hypotheses, continually retested m those great laboratories of the law,
the courts of justice. Every new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which
seems applicable yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered.").
13. The author's preference for a "case-by-case" approach may have its roots in the
"rule of reason" theory of antitrust law, which holds that the legality of a restraint
of trade must be tested in the light of "the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied." Cbhcago Board of Trade v. Umted States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) (Brandeis, J.) A rule of reason approach does not, however, preclude the use
--of rules which treat similar cases in a like manner. Once a restraint has been tested
in the light of relevant facts and held to be illegal, a rule prohibiting all similar re-
.stramts, in the absence of distinguishing circumstances, would be consistent with the
rule of reason.
14. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
15. A. STIcKELs, supra note 3, at 169, 171. Milton Handler recently commented on
the usefulness of economic theory in antitrust law, cautioning that the assumptions
-of the theory may not be valid in the real world:
It is our responsibility as practitioners to help the courts in attaining
precise definitions, and in converting economic concepts into adrmistrable
legal principles. It is no disrespect to economists to point out that while
they can assist the bench and bar'by formulating the questions needing
1973]
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Because of the noncommittal character of Federal Control of Busi-
ness, a student would receive from it less help in analyzing the cases than
he can obtain from his casebook. For example, in the portion of the
book discussing price-fixing, 16 the doctrine that such conduct is a per se
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act is stated but then in effect
qualified by summary recitations of the facts and opinions in Uited
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,1' Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 8 Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc v. Federal Trade Comimsson,'19
Cbicago Board of Trade v. United States,20 and several other cases.
Appalacbian Coals and Chicago Board of Trade were decided before the
per se rule was fully formulated and are not consistent with such a rule.
The textbook does provide some assistance to the reader in reconciling
Appalacbian Coals with Socony by noting that Socony would be followed
today, by referring to the finding in Socony that the defendants' activities
had had an effect on price, and by pointing out that the defendants in
Appalacbian Coals had not yet put their plan into operation. Never-
theless, the student will be likely to find a more helpful analysis of Ap-
palacban Coals in his casebook.21 Because the textbook intertwines the
discussions of the two cases while omitting a full statement of the facts
in Socony, a student who reads only the textbook without examining
the cases themselves may not even realize that there is a sharp contrast
between Socony and Appalacbian Coals. As for Cbicago Board of
exploration, they don't purport to have all the answers. They expect no
more than that their investigations provide illumination in policy mak-
ing-not that their speculations be treated as black letter rules. They
recognize that the imponderables of policy are as baffling to them as they
are to lawyers. Economic theory, if accepted for what it is, can be a val-
uable tool in the hands of lawyers. But we do not advance legal science
if we place untried theories on the pedestal of infallibility and foreclose
all inquiry into pertinent facts.
2 M. HANDLER, TwENTY-FVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 1072 (1973)
A role for economic theory in antitrust law might be justified even without factual
verification of its assumptions on the basis of Richard Posner's argument that "many
areas of the law, especially the great common law fields of property, torts, and con-
tracts," reflect the principles of economic theory See R. POsNER, ECONOMIC ANALysiS
OF LAW 6 (1972).
16. A. STiCCELLS, supra note 3, at 116-27
17. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
18. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
19. 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958).
20. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
21. See, e.g., P AREEIA, AN-rTRUST ANM.YSIs 272-75 (1967); M. HANDLER, CASES AM
MATRIMALS ON TRADE REGULATION 231-32 (4th ed. 1967).
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Trade, no attempt is made to explain the significance of Justice Brandeis'
famous opinion, and the "price-fixing" aspect of the case is -bscured by
a material misstatement of the facts. 22
By muting the conflict between principles of antitrust law in cases
where they clash, the author has made it difficult for his readers to tell
what has been decided. The text tends generally to neglect the argu-
ments of dissenters, with the result that the reader is often unable to
appraise the full significance of a decision. For example, the definition
of the market in which to measure the monopoly power of the de-
fendants in Unted States v. Grinnell Corp.28 has perhaps had a greater
impact because of Justice Fortas' dissent that the Court "tailored the
market to the dimensions of the defendants" by adopting a "strange,
red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man with-a-limp classification" 24 than
because of the principles adduced by the majority to support its market
definition. Yet from Stickells' discussion of Grinnell,25 the reader would
not be aware of the point at issue between majority and minority As a
result, the book not only lacks the liveliness it could have but also con-
veys the misleading impression that recent antitrust decisions of the
Supreme Court have not been controversial.
Quite aside from a deficiency of analysis, the book's usefulness is im-
paired by confusing and repetitious summaries of individual cases. The
reader, for instance, would probably be unable to understand from the
discussion 26 of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. StIffel Co 27 that in that case the
Supreme Court construed federal antitrust and patent laws as forbidding
the application of state unfair competition laws to prevent copying of an
unpatentable item. Antitrust laws are not mentioned, patent laws are not
discussed except for the use of the word "unpatented," and there is no
mention of a conflict between federal and state laws. Although the
reasoning of the Court in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange28 Is sum-
22. The "call" rule, the legality of which was in question m Chicago Board of
Trade, is described as prohibiting members of the exchange from "producing or offer-
ing to purchase certain grams" while the exchange was closed. A. SvicxElns, supra note
3, at 121. In fact, the rule prohibited members from purchasing or offering to pur-
chase the grains in question while the exchange was closed except at a price equal
to the closing bid of the previous session of the exchange. 246 U.S. at 237
23. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
24. Id. at 590-91.
25. A. STicIELLs, supra note 3, at 175-77
26. Id. at 34-35.
27. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
28. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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marized, 29 treatment of the case suffers because the facts are stated after,
rather than before, the applicable legal principles are discussed.
The book is poorly edited. Verbosity,"0 repetitious discussions,31 un-
clear sentences,32 rusprints,83 and spelling mistakes34 have been permitted
to remain in the text. In the index of cases, section references are pro-
vided for only a small percentage of the cases listed. Frequently, cases
are discussed in several different sections of the book without cross-
references to the other discussions. Since facts are sometimes omitted
when a case is discussed a second time, lack of cross-references results in
confusion.35
Federal Control of Business compiles into a convenient format mucr
useful information. For example, the author reprints from Farmington~
Dowel Products Co v. Forster Mfg. Co 31 the table of attorney's fees
awarded in some 30 private treble damage actions. Nevertheless, because
of its lack of analysis and confusing presentation, the book cannot be
recommended.
29. A. STcKELLS, supra note 3, at 130-31.
30. For example, a quotation is introduced as follows: "The summary of the prin-
ciples may be seen in the statement from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the
following statement Id. at 735.
31. For example, the last full sentence on page 344 is identical to the first full sen-
tence on that page, except for addition of the word "also" and correction of a mis-
print.
32. An illustration is the following statement: "The commodity is one subject to
competition by other like products, which is to say a commodity which is in free and
open competition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed
by others." Id. at 299.
33. For example, a book by Kaysen and Turner is attributed to "Kagsen and
Tunner." Id. at 168 n.51.
34. At one point, reference is made to the "Cannons of Ethics." Id. at 746.
35. For example, Umted States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), is
discussed cryptically on page 334, with no cross-reference to the earlier discussion
of the case on page 319.
36. 297 F Supp. 924, 931-36 (D. Me.), rewmanded on other grounds, 421 F.2d 61
(1st Cir. 1970).
